April 27, 2017

French government evaluation of Syrian chemical weapons agreement


The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official assessment of the April 4 Syrian chemical weapons attack on Khan Shaykhun, and analysis of the Syrian chemical weapons program. The report can be read or downloaded in English from the Ministry's website

The report consists of four sections:

1. – Technical analysis of the chemical attack on 4 April
2. – Militarily analysis of the tactical situation around 4 April 2017
3. – Analysis of the presence of armed groups in Hama and of their capabilities
4. – Continuation since 2013 of a clandestine Syrian chemical weapons programme

Sections 1 through 3 are consistent with the conclusions of other competent intelligence services, except perhaps the Russians, and no one believes the Syrian regime. It lays out a compelling case that the Syrian Air Force was responsible for the use of sarin gas in the attack.

It is Section 4 that interests me. So that I am not accused of cherry-picking words, I have included the text of the entire section (in British English). I have highlighted what I believe are significant passages.

4. – Continuation since 2013 of a clandestine Syrian chemical weapons programme

a) In a previous declassified national report in 2013, the French services laid out their knowledge of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and chemical attacks perpetrated by the regime. They noted that sarin was principally used in binary form: a mixture of methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF), a key precursor in the manufacture of sarin, and isopropanol produced just before use.

France informed the OPCW that Syria’s explanations on the quantities of DF declared – approximately 20 tonnes – as having been used in tests or lost in accidents were exaggerated. Moreover, France has observed since 2014 Syrian attempts to acquire dozens of tonnes of isopropanol. The Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) from the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW has been unable to obtain any proof of the veracity of Syria’s declarations. The OPCW itself has identified major inconsistencies in Syria’s explanations concerning the presence of sarin derivatives on several sites where no activity relating to the toxin had been declared.

b) On the basis of the conclusions of the DAT and its own intelligence, France assesses that major doubts remain as to the accuracy, exhaustiveness and sincerity of the decommissioning of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. In particular, France assesses that Syria has maintained a capacity to produce or stock sarin, despite its commitment to destroy all stocks and capacities. Lastly, France assesses that Syria has not declared tactical munitions (grenades and rockets) such as those repeatedly used since 2013.

c) The Damascus regime has continued to employ chemical weapons against its population since Syria’s accession to the CWC on 13 October 2013. There have been over 100 allegations of such use, concerning chlorine as well as sarin.

Since 2014, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) has published several reports confirming the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The UN-OPCW Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) has investigated nine allegations of chemical weapons employment. In its reports in August and October 2016, the JIM attributed three cases of employment of chlorine to the Damascus regime and one of mustard gas to Daesh.


The French seem to agree with me. The Syrians lied, had no intention of complying with the agreement, and continued to produce and stockpile chemical weapons.

In June of 2015, two years after the Russian-U.S. brokered agreement that supposedly led to the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, U.S. intelligence agencies warned that Syrian forces might again use chemical weapons against opposition groups. This was almost two years after the Syrians agreed to rid themselves of their stockpile of chemical weapons. I wrote a detailed article - Syrian regime might use chemical weapons - how is that possible? In the article, I reviewed the situation as of that point in time, as well as provide links to a series of my articles on the Syrian chemical weapons program.

FRANCONA:
Anyone* who has ever worked or lived in Syria got a chuckle out of the thought that the regime of Bashar al-Asad would give up his chemical weapons. Syria maintains its chemical weapons arsenal and delivery systems to provide a deterrent against an attack by the vastly superior (and nuclear-equipped) Israeli armed forces. Its ballistic missiles and squadron of SU-24 (NATO: FENCER) fighter-bombers can deliver chemical weapons to virtually anywhere in Israel.

The thought that the Syrians would give up their chemical weapons arsenal was, and remains, ludicrous. However, the Syrians' primary sponsor - Russia - saw an opportunity to back [then Secretary of State John] Kerry and the United States into a corner. The Russians announced that they had brokered a deal in which the Syrians would give up their chemical weapons in return for an American commitment to call off impending military action against Syria. Obama jumped at the chance.


I have to wonder if U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry actually believed his own rhetoric. I know of no serious Middle East analyst who thought that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had any intention of complying with the 2013 agreement, for the reasons I have been stating since at least 2000.

I also have to wonder if Russian Minister of Foreign Sergey Lavrov, an accomplished negotiator and excellent advocate for the Russian regime and the president he serves, was complicit in the Syrian deception. It would not surprise me if President Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov and Bashar al-Asad all conspired to craft an agreement that they knew was no more than a sham.**

I am also struck by the seeming naivete of John Kerry, and possibly Barack Obama. Their later performance in negotiating - well, mostly capitulating - the Iran nuclear deal does not fill me with confidence that the Iranian deal has any more chance of achieving its objectives in the nuclear arena than the Syrian deal did about chemical weapons. Call me skeptical.

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* From 1992 to 1995, I served as the Air Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. It was part of my brief to monitor the capabilities of the Syrian armed forces, including their chemical warfare capabilities.
** My Arabic-speaking friends will appreciate that definition. Al-Sham is the Arabic word for Damascus, Syria or the Levant, depending on context.