May 13, 2017

Erdoğan - Trump meeting -- here are your talking points, Mr. President

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Donald J. Trump 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is scheduled to visit President Donald Trump at the White House on May 16. The main topic of discussion will be the situation in Syria - primarily the ongoing fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

One of Mr. Erdoğan's reasons for the quick and short trip to Washington is to request President Trump reconsider the American decision to provide more arms to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is composed of Syrian Arabs and Kurds operating in northern Syria against ISIS - they have been by far the most effective ground force combatting ISIS.

The Kurdish component of the SDF is the People's Protection Units, in Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastina Gel‎ (YPG). The Turks maintain that the YPG is nothing more than the Syrian branch of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, in Kurdish Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK).

The PKK has been designated as a terrorist organization by not only Turkey but also the United States, NATO and the European Union. However, the United States does not consider the YPG to be part of the PKK. To the Turks, they are one and the same.

Since August 2016, the Turks have been supporting a major Free Syrian Army (FSA) incursion into northern Syria codenamed Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkish support has included airpower, armor, artillery, reconnaissance, logistics and special forces. Several Turkish troops have been killed by ISIS, including two captured soldiers who were burned alive.

The Turks had hoped that the FSA force would eventually make its way south and east into Syria via al-Bab, Manbij and on to al-Raqqah. Unfortunately, as the FSA force moved into Syria and fought successfully against ISIS, the Turks opted to have the FSA engage in offensive operations against the SDF as well as ISIS, claiming that the SDF's YPG component was part of the PKK.

In an unusual but not unheard of arrangement with the Syrian Army - and their Russian backers (some would say masters) - the SDF allowed the Syrian military to move north into the Manbij area and effectively block the advance of the FSA and their Turkish Army support troops. Russian and U.S. troops monitor the agreement in close proximity to each other.

This map shows the current situation.



Perhaps Turkish intelligence has failed to brief Mr. Erdoğan that the FSA forces he wants to liberate al-Raqqah are effectively blocked by the SDF and Syrians. The FSA force is at least 60 miles away from al-Raqqah, but in reality about 100 road march miles away. They are not in a position to mount an attack on al-Raqqah. In fact, Euphrates Shield forces no longer have a front line with ISIS.

The Turkish decision - I assume Mr. Erdoğan was involved in making the decision - to attack SDF positions while both the FSA and the SDF were fighting ISIS has probably eliminated any chance that there will be cooperation between the two anti-ISIS forces.

To illustrate why this decision was a major blunder, let's look at the Turkish armed forces' proposals for the FSA Operation Euphrates Shield force to mount an assault on al-Raqqah. First, the Turks attack U.S.-backed forces, then demand the United States arrange for them to take the lead in the attack on al-Raqqah.



The Turks have proposed two options. As seen on the map, one option is to have the United States arrange with the SDF - the same force the Turks have been attacking along the entire length of the Syrian border - a safe passage corridor from the Turkish city of Akçakale (opposite the Syrian city of Tal Abyad) south 50 miles to al-Raqqah.

The Turks would have to move the entire FSA force from current positions in the al-Bab area back to Turkey, then east to Akçakale, cross the border into SDF-controlled Syrian territory, and finally move to attack positions near al-Raqqah. These positions have been secured by the SDF at great human cost.

I do not believe the SDF will countenance a Turkish-backed and supported FSA force moving through their territory. The Turks have poisoned those waters by the airstrikes and artillery attacks on SDF units over the last few weeks.

The second option is less challenging politically, but might be logistically impossible. Note the twisted ribbon-like arc to the south of the FSA positions ending near al-Raqqah. The twisted ribbon represents an airborne/heliborne assault.

If - big if - the United States wants to placate an important NATO ally despite its unhelpful actions, it could offer to try and coordinate some FSA participation in the coming attack on al-Raqqah. A small air assault might be the vehicle to do this. However, this would reward the Turks for their petulance.

So, Mr. President - to summarize your talking points:

- Mr. Erdoğan, your FSA supported forces are bottled up near al-Bab, almost 100 miles from al-Raqqah.
- Your air and artillery attacks on SDF forces, which are backed by my forces - including U.S. troops on the ground - have obstructed progress in the fight against ISIS and wasted valuable time.
- The Kurds are now only about three miles from al-Raqqah and pressing the attack.
- Time is of the essence - we believe ISIS is planning attacks on the West, and the people of al-Raqqah deserve relief from ISIS rule.
- Once al-Raqqah falls, there may be a role for the FSA, but I do not see a role for them in the assault.
- Now, let's talk about the future of the Kurds in Syria....

For more detailed coverage of the Turkish experience in northern Syria and Erdoğan's resulting petulance, see my earlier articles: Syria - has Turkey been marginalized and the Americans thrust into the fight? and Turkey and the fight against ISIS - whose side are you on?



May 9, 2017

Russian parade in Syria shows off some of their equipment


"Title: "Military exhibition at Humaymim Air Base" (Video is in Russian)

To celebrate the Allied victory in World War II, the Russian expeditionary force deployed to Humaymim air base, Syria, conducted a military parade (watch above). While the parade itself was pretty mundane, the music performed by a Russian Army band was pretty good, but what interested me was the glimpse at some of the military equipment at the base.

The base parking apron used for the parade looked like a sales brochure for the Sukhoi aircraft company - a display of a SU-24 (FENCER D), SU-25 (FROGFOOT), SU-30 (FLANKER C), SU-34 (FULLBACK), and SU-35 (FLANKER E) combat aircraft.

However, for us military equipment junkies, there was a glimpse of less exciting, but interesting equipment.

Having been the Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Syria in the 1990's, I have looked at a lot of this equipment in the past. Surprisingly, much of the Russian electronic equipment at the base is still of that earlier vintage.

Although the Russians have deployed state-of-the-art air defenses and electronic warfare systems to the base, those were not caught by the cameras.

Some things I thought were of interest:



Background: A-50 (MAINSTAY) airborne early warning




Two IL-20 (COOT A) reconnaissance aircraft flanking
an AN-30 (CLANK) cartographic aircraft




TU-154 (CARELESS) – transport "The Ivan Express”



- P-18 (SPOON REST D) early warning radar
- prob ATC radar in radome
- 1L22 Parol IFF dish
- P-18 radar



Same as above, then:

PRV-11 (SIDE NET) and PRV-9 (THIN SKIN) height-finder radars



Note drone and the PRV-9 THIN SKIN



Russian girls enjoying the celebration

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My thanks to CWO3 R. A. Stonerock, U.S. Army (Ret), my colleague in the Defense Attache Office in Damascus for his assistance on the radar identifications. I learned a lot about weapons/equipment from him.




May 8, 2017

Russian military police as monitors in Syrian safe zones? Seriously?

Russian Military Police in Syria

At least two senior Russian Federation government officials have announced the deployment of additional Russian Army military police to monitor and provide security for the "de-escalation zones" as part of a three-party agreement reached by Russia, Turkey and Iran. The agreement took effect on May 6. (See my last article, "De-escalation" zones in Syria - call me skeptical)

Neither the Syrian government, the United States, nor any of the opposition groups are party to the agreement. The Syrian government, not surprisingly, has followed the bidding of its Russian and Iranian masters and has proclaimed support for the pact.

The Russian announcements may be a bit premature at best, or a downright power play at worst. The agreement is somewhat ambiguous - call me conspiratorial, but when the Russians write anything, they make sure there are loopholes - okay, I will be kind, ambiguities - that serve their interests.*

According to the text of the agreement, security zones along the lines of the de-escalation zones are to be established in order to prevent incidents and military confrontations between the combatants. This security includes checkpoints and observation posts, and "administration of the security zones" - all conducted by the forces of the three signatories.

Although the agreement allows for third party forces to be introduced, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'alim** has rejected any "international" presence. I take that as a reference to the United Nations or powers not acceptable to the regime of Bashar al-Asad. Why have anyone interfere with the Russians?



So let me see if I have this right. Two key provisions:

- Russia, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement on "de-escalation" zones in Syria, without buy-in from the opposition, the Kurds, or the U.S.-led coalition, but dictate who can and cannot fly or conduct ground operations in specific areas of the country.

- The agreement charges the three powers to deploy their forces to lines around the safe zones, and then establish checkpoints, observation posts and "administer" those zones.

So, in effect, we have the military forces of primarily Russia (with possibly some Iranian and Turkish units) surrounding the areas of the country that remain under opposition control. The Russians then control movement into and out of the opposition areas while monitoring the enemies of the very regime that the Russians are in Syria to protect.

What could possibly go wrong?

When this ceasefire, like those in the past, fails - the Russians will be in perfect position to usher in Syrian and Iranian troops, and begin airstrikes with tactical air control parties already in place. No doubt, the Syrian forces, with their Iranian and Hizballah supporters, are redeploying and resupplying for that day.

That's what could go wrong.

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* For an example of Russian skill at wordsmithing, see my article on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and former Secretary of State John Kerry, Iran's ballistic missile program - more fallout from the "Kerry Collapse"

** Personal anecdote:

When I was the Air Attache to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, I met with Dr. al-Mu'alim on several occasions, including an extended conversation on his Syrian Air Force VIP jet flying to and from the air base at Humaymim, now the primary Russian base in Syria. I found him to be a very capable representative of his government - tough and committed, but a pleasant conversant. He graded my Arabic language as A-.



May 6, 2017

"De-escalation" zones in Syria - call me skeptical

Russian military map of "de-escalation" zones in Syria

Today (Saturday, May 6) starts yet another effort to stop some of the carnage in Syria - the establishment of four what the Russians are calling "de-escalation" zones, a variation of no-fly zones.

While we all hope for a diplomatic solution to the six-year-old civil war in the country, this appears to be another in a series of ceasefire agreements, all of which have failed.

This one, unfortunately, will likely be no different. There are undoubtedly side deals between the three sponsoring parties - Russia, Turkey and Iran - and many loopholes for the combatants. The losers, or course, are the Syrian people, the opposition forces, and the Kurds.

I have numbered the four zones designated by the three parties on the Russian military map above. Zone 1 consists of most of Idlib and parts of Hamah governorates. Zone 2 is a smaller area occupied by elements of the opposition called the "al-Rastan pocket" located just north of the city of Homs. Zone 3 is the East Ghutah, the suburbs just east of the capital of Damascus, while zone 4 is the opposition-occupied areas in the south in al-Qunaytirah and Dara' governorates.

The agreement specifically exempts what are called "designated terrorist groups" - groups which have been identified as Islamist or former affiliates of al-Qa'idah. The al-Qa'idah affiliate was formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusrah, then later Jaysh Fatah al-Sham, and now as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Because of numerous instances of tactical cooperation between so-called "moderate" groups that comprise the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the designated Islamist groups, they are all intermingled in a complex patchwork throughout the designated de-escalation zones.

Before the first day was over, combat aircraft of the Russian and Syrian air forces dropped a variety of weapons on the delineated de-escalation zone in Hamah - supposedly a no-fly zone. The areas in and around the highly contested city of al-Lataminah were hit with artillery and numerous air strikes, including at least 10 by barrel bombs. According to reliable maps, the opposition fighters in al-Lataminah are not members of HTS or other specifically designated terrorist organizations.

This is exactly what happened in virtually all previous attempted ceasefires. All of the previous agreements included the same provision - the ceasefire did not apply to designated terrorist groups. The Syrians and Russians failed to honor the distinction between the two categories - any group in opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Asad was deemed to be a terrorist organization and targeted as such.

I suspect this lack of distinction between groups opposing the regime will continue. How trustworthy is a regime that uses chemical weapons on its own population?

The United States is not a signatory to the de-escalation agreement, but, according to the State Department, "the United States supports any effort that can genuinely de-escalate the violence in Syria, ensure unhindered humanitarian access, focus energies on the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorists, and create the conditions for a credible political resolution of the conflict." (Read the Department of State statement.)

The U.S. Department of Defense noted that the de-escalation agreement would not affect the U.S.-led air campaign against ISIS. To make that point clear to the Russians, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joe Dunford spoke by telephone with his Russian counterpart. Both officers agreed to continue deconflicting air operations in Syria.

I suspect the Russians are anxious to avoid a confrontation with the United States - Russian President Vladimir Putin believes, rightly in my opinion, that any political solution in Syria will require American support. Putin and President Donald Trump held a lengthy telephone conversation about Syria earlier in the week.

Should the two presidents come to an understanding about resolving the conflict in Syria, each will have to make accommodations with groups the two countries are supporting. The opposition may have to give up its hopes for the removal of the Ba'th Party regime, while the Russians may have to agree to the removal of the party's leader, President Bashar al-Asad.

In any case, there are other problems with the de-escalation agreement. The exact details are not yet known, but I am certain there are side deals between the three signatories, especially between the Russians and Turks.

This de-escalation agreement appears to repair relations between Moscow and Ankara, strained since November 2015 when Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter jets downed a Russian Air Force Su-24 fighter-bomber which the Turks claimed violated Turkish airspace. The pilot was killed by Syrian rebels after parachuting safely to the ground.

The Turks are seeking relevance in northern Syria and hope that the terms of this agreement provide that. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is angry over how Turkey has been marginalized in northern Syria.

No one trusts Erdogan, especially given his recent attacks on the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) while they are engaged in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

For more detailed coverage of the Turkish experience in northern Syria and Erdogan's resulting petulance, see my earlier articles: Syria - has Turkey been marginalized and the Americans thrust into the fight? and Turkey and the fight against ISIS - whose side are you on?

Erdogan hopes to insert Turkish troops into Idlib province, making up for his marginalization in Aleppo province. He will use authority under this agreement to operate in Syria (which technically he now lacks) to continue his attempts to ensure that the Kurdish population on his southern border is not permitted to create an autonomous region similar to the Kurdish Autonomous Region across the border in northern Iraq.

Erdogan further hopes that his participation in this agreement will give him standing to convince the Trump Administration that Turkish troops supporting the FSA should lead the coming assault on the ISIS stronghold of al-Raqqah.

There is a senior delegation made up of Turkish military and intelligence officials headed to Washington for discussions - I suspect their pleas will fall on deaf ears. President Erdogan himself is due to meet with President Trump on May 16 - I expect this issue to be raised.

In addition to Turkey's petulance, it is also a matter of time and distance. The American-backed SDF is on the northern outskirts of the city and is pressing an attack from the west, having recently closed on the city of al-Tabaqah. SDF forces are as close as five miles to al-Raqqah, while the Turkish-supported FSA is at least 50 miles away, bottled up in a pocket bordered by Syrian regime forces and the SDF.

Turkey's attacks on the SDF along the Syrian border have closed any window of opportunity for Erdogan to salvage his role in northern Syria, and rightfully so.

In the meantime, Russian and Syrian aircraft will continue to bomb - albeit at a lower operations tempo - the same targets they have for months.




May 4, 2017

American troops in Iraq after the "defeat" of ISIS? A good idea....

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joe Dunford
meets with members of the coalition (DoD Photo) 

According to officials of both the U.S. and Iraqi governments, Prime Minister Haydar al-'Abadi has opened talks with the Trump Administration to keep American troops in Iraq after the presumed "defeat" of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

I applaud the prime minister's decision to reach an agreement whereby the gains of the past almost three years are not lost when American troops are no longer present to advise and assist their Iraqi colleagues. I think it is clear that until the Iraqi forces are capable of defending the country on their own, the presence of American troops is needed to ensure Iraq’s security.

I think it is also a realization that after the battle of Mosul is over (as well as the coming battle of al-Raqqah in Syria), ISIS will not be completely defeated - it will remain a threat to Iraq. The group knows full well that at some point in the not too distant future, they will lose their territorial holdings.

ISIS has already begun the transition from a so-called "state" to an insurgency. Surprisingly, their message resonates with many Sunni Iraqis who believe themselves to be disenfranchised by an Iranian-influenced, Shi'a-dominated government in Baghdad.

Of course, Prime Minister al-'Abadi may not be in a position to guarantee a continued U.S. presence in Iraq. A new round of elections is scheduled for September of this year - the voting might well be the end of al-'Abadi's government.*

The two major threats to his continued leadership are the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki. In my opinion, either would be a disaster for Iraq, U.S.-Iraqi relations, and American foreign policy in the region.

It was Nuri al-Maliki - in concert with Barack Obama in what I believe was a colossal foreign policy blunder, easily his worst - who presided over the complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011.

The result of the Obama/al-Maliki decision was the corruption and atrophy of the Iraqi Army, the resurgence of the almost-defeated al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) terrorist group, the transformation of AQI into ISIS, and the mess that is the current geopolitical situation we now have in the region.

We do not need a repeat of that disaster. A small American military presence is a good idea until ISIS is no longer a threat, or the Iraqis are capable of their own defense.

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* For my assessment of the upcoming Iraqi elections, see Iraqi Prime Minister al-'Abadi in Washington - some realities.